Tradução bilíngue, notas comentadas, índice analítico em português e alemão.
Disponível em: http://www.psicanaliseefilosofia.com.br/textos/InvestigacoesFilosoficas-Original.pdf
segunda-feira, 20 de novembro de 2017
sábado, 1 de julho de 2017
Can we Translate the Character of a Text?
Physiognomy of the Text
Abstract:
In this paper I will initially present an excerpt translated by Brian McGuinness (MS 122,
pp. 88r-88v) as a motive for a critical consideration of one of the main concepts among
Wittgensteinian translators: the physiognomy of a text. The excerpt from the MS 122 is
a codified observation in which Wittgenstein briefly considers the character of all great
art as a piece which always has the primitive drives of mankind as its ground-bass –
something which was missing in his own work in architecture. McGuinness, commenting
on Wittgenstein’s writing style, proposes his translation as a model that allows us to
glimpse the character of Wittgenstein’s own texts, which is, according to his view, of an
ascetic practice presented as a form of ornament. By putting an alternative translation
right beside McGuinness’ proposal, I will discuss the Portuguese translation of the
“Remarks on Frazer’s the Golden Bough” (Wittgenstein, 2011), the new Portuguese
translation of the “Philosophical Investigations” (to appear), and the project for a
Portuguese translation of the “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” (work in
progress) as works carried out according to the latter alternative. Both alternatives,
however, will be treated in this article as “physiognomies”, for the purpose of such a
comparison is to ask about the adequacy of using that concept as a guideline in translating
Wittgenstein.
Key-words: Wittgenstein; translation theory; physiognomy; aspect perception; language-games.
Link: Can we Translate the Character of a Text?
Originally presented at the Norwegian-Brazilian SPIRE Workshop
Wittgenstein In/On Translation, at the University of Bergen
in June 26, 2017.
Originally presented at the Norwegian-Brazilian SPIRE Workshop
Wittgenstein In/On Translation, at the University of Bergen
in June 26, 2017.
sábado, 23 de janeiro de 2016
Comer Carne e Comer Gente (Cora Diamond).
Tradução do célebre texto de crítica do abstracionismo moral nos argumentos de Peter Singer e Tom Regan, e de defesa do vegetarianismo sob a base, digamos assim – se for possível –, de uma espécie de ética propositiva e criativa da imaginação. Uma forma de ação moral erigida em atenção a detalhes específicos da realidade do caso e sensível às singularidades emocionais em jogo nos diferentes contextos vivenciais involucrados nessa ação. Uma bela crítica do utilitarismo e, talvez um pouco mais distante, da deontologia.
Tradução do célebre texto de crítica do abstracionismo moral nos argumentos de Peter Singer e Tom Regan, e de defesa do vegetarianismo sob a base, digamos assim – se for possível –, de uma espécie de ética propositiva e criativa da imaginação. Uma forma de ação moral erigida em atenção a detalhes específicos da realidade do caso e sensível às singularidades emocionais em jogo nos diferentes contextos vivenciais involucrados nessa ação. Uma bela crítica do utilitarismo e, talvez um pouco mais distante, da deontologia.
sábado, 26 de dezembro de 2015
Observações Sobre os Fundamentos da Matemática - L. Wittgenstein
Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik - L. Wittgenstein
This research project consists mainly
in a pair of related items: the first is to provide the necessary means to
deliver in a critical edition a bilingual and commented translation (German-Portuguese)
of the Wittgensteinian text denominated by its original editors as “Remarks on the Foundations
of Mathematics”; the second is to take seriously the author’s literary style
rendering the text through his own concept of “physiognomy”. About the first aim,
the purpose is to collect the set of manuscripts and typescrits composed on the
subject between 1937 and 1944 for a work of comparison among primary and more
elaborated versions, as well as later cuttings, handwritten notes on the
typescripts, and lectures on the subject around the same time. About the second
aim, that is to see in what sense Wittgenstein conceived his grammatical
investigation on logic and mathematics as a morphology, i.e., not only taking
mathematicians as inventors rather than discoverers, but as a philosophical
activity guided by a double condition of authenticity and recognition. This
sort of comprehension is necessary to understand the text not as a cognitive
piece of discussion, which can lead to serious misunderstandings about the nature
of his investigations, but as a work on oneself through writing about
philosophical puzzles, or as an ethical/aesthetic philosophical performance
whose objective is to leave mathematics as it is while it is liberated from a
variety of philosophical confusions.
Research supported by FAPESP: Grant number 16/21147-8.
sábado, 12 de dezembro de 2015
PHILOSOPHICAL UNAWARENESS
João
José R. L. De Almeida
joaojose@unicamp.br
The Singularity of Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations. Physiognomy of the Text.
(in Portuguese: Editora da
Unicamp, February 2016).
It always
seemed intriguing to me that Wittgenstein, one of the twentieth century’s most
well-known, admired and quoted philosophers, is so barely understood. What I
mean is how is it possible to know exactly or even approximately what kind of
philosophical activity he developed through his texts, when we have so many
interpretations around: conceptual therapy, anti-philosophy, skepticism,
communitarianism, mathematical naturalism, moderate intuitionism, full-blooded
conventionalism, quietism, grammatical mapping of philosophical concepts? How
is it possible that experts arrived to such amount of divergent philosophical
views? But difficulty to fully understand his philosophy becomes really fascinating
if we noticed that many people do not even realize that they did not understand
him or his texts. Examples abound in this direction: Russell, Moore, Frege,
Ayer, Waismann, Marcuse, Dummett, etc., just to mention some philosophers from
the past.
Contrary to the first appearances, Wittgenstein’s later texts are not properly obscure, in the plain sense of the word, or even forged in a philosophical idiom of its own. And perhaps we can also include the Tractatus, his first book, in that category. Wittgenstein’s texts are composed in a fairly normal or colloquial language, intersected with several dialogical situations where two or three voices sometimes interact. But his compositions are rather condensed and come to any conclusion. The fact is that as long as such writing style may present some challenges, it surely was not the first time in the world that such thing happened in the literature. So what is exactly the problem, and from where does it arise?
Difficulty to understand Wittgenstein is not only a widespread and popular joke (cf. Felix Bennett in the Philosophers' Magazine cover, 2006, issue 33), it was also a concern expressed a long time ago by Maurice Drury (in Rhees, Rush (ed.). Recollections of Wittgenstein, pp. 76-85), one of his former pupils and personal friend, and something that Wittgenstein himself once acknowledged too (idem, p. 78). It is a theme from a recently published book by James Klagge (Wittgenstein in Exile, The MIT Press, 2011), and from an article published by Paul Horwich in The New York Times (“Was Wittgenstein Right?”, The New York Times, 03/03/2013).
In this very sense, David Stern once asked a strange question: “How many Wittgensteins?” (in A. Pichler, S. Säätelä (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works, 2006, pp. 205–229). There are not only early and later Wittgensteins, apparently two quite different persons, but also a skeptical and a theoretical irreconcilables Wittgensteins, according to him.
I’m trying to work on this intriguing problem that might be called, in the lack of a better name, philosophical unawareness. It is possible that texts and their author are internally related, so that the best way of reading is to understand them performatively, as someone trying to fulfill two hard conditions: a condition of authenticity, fighting philosophical illusions as a care of the self, and a condition of recognition, writing about his battles for an ideal and qualified reader. All the texts, at least those written from 1929 to 1951, could also be considered as a huge package of failed attempts to publish a book. Maybe one single book, idealized in several different forms at different times, and ultimately never published. Behind and connected to that large collection of unfinished manuscripts and typescripts there is an author, someone whose stomach aches are irrelevant to the reader except by the means that he envisioned to fight them (cf. MS 136, p. 144a). Texts for the care of himself, so to say. The kind of philosophical practice remembered by Pierre Hadot in regard to Ancient Philosophy.1
I’m publishing now (February, 2016) a book on those problems, entitled The Singularity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Physiognomy of the Text (in Portuguese, by Editora da Unicamp). Wittgenstein’s thinking is presented there as expression of a kind of philosophical activity that has virtually no place nowadays.
Contrary to the first appearances, Wittgenstein’s later texts are not properly obscure, in the plain sense of the word, or even forged in a philosophical idiom of its own. And perhaps we can also include the Tractatus, his first book, in that category. Wittgenstein’s texts are composed in a fairly normal or colloquial language, intersected with several dialogical situations where two or three voices sometimes interact. But his compositions are rather condensed and come to any conclusion. The fact is that as long as such writing style may present some challenges, it surely was not the first time in the world that such thing happened in the literature. So what is exactly the problem, and from where does it arise?
Difficulty to understand Wittgenstein is not only a widespread and popular joke (cf. Felix Bennett in the Philosophers' Magazine cover, 2006, issue 33), it was also a concern expressed a long time ago by Maurice Drury (in Rhees, Rush (ed.). Recollections of Wittgenstein, pp. 76-85), one of his former pupils and personal friend, and something that Wittgenstein himself once acknowledged too (idem, p. 78). It is a theme from a recently published book by James Klagge (Wittgenstein in Exile, The MIT Press, 2011), and from an article published by Paul Horwich in The New York Times (“Was Wittgenstein Right?”, The New York Times, 03/03/2013).
In this very sense, David Stern once asked a strange question: “How many Wittgensteins?” (in A. Pichler, S. Säätelä (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works, 2006, pp. 205–229). There are not only early and later Wittgensteins, apparently two quite different persons, but also a skeptical and a theoretical irreconcilables Wittgensteins, according to him.
I’m trying to work on this intriguing problem that might be called, in the lack of a better name, philosophical unawareness. It is possible that texts and their author are internally related, so that the best way of reading is to understand them performatively, as someone trying to fulfill two hard conditions: a condition of authenticity, fighting philosophical illusions as a care of the self, and a condition of recognition, writing about his battles for an ideal and qualified reader. All the texts, at least those written from 1929 to 1951, could also be considered as a huge package of failed attempts to publish a book. Maybe one single book, idealized in several different forms at different times, and ultimately never published. Behind and connected to that large collection of unfinished manuscripts and typescripts there is an author, someone whose stomach aches are irrelevant to the reader except by the means that he envisioned to fight them (cf. MS 136, p. 144a). Texts for the care of himself, so to say. The kind of philosophical practice remembered by Pierre Hadot in regard to Ancient Philosophy.1
I’m publishing now (February, 2016) a book on those problems, entitled The Singularity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Physiognomy of the Text (in Portuguese, by Editora da Unicamp). Wittgenstein’s thinking is presented there as expression of a kind of philosophical activity that has virtually no place nowadays.
___________
1. Such similarity with Ancient Philosophy was
suggested to me by Yuri Zacra in personal conversation, but it is also
mentioned by James Conant in “Philosophy and Biography” in: Klagge, J. (ed.). Wittgenstein: Biography & Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2001, p. 20.
sexta-feira, 22 de maio de 2015
quinta-feira, 23 de abril de 2015
Curso: Freud e a Interpretação dos Sonhos
Curso de extensão (FCA/Unicamp):
Freud e a Interpretação dos Sonhos
32 horas
Inscrições abertas até 04/05/2015.
O objetivo do curso é analisar a origem, a formação e a lógica envolvida na ideia freudiana de interpretação do sonho, particularmente no que se refere às suas possibilidades e motivações epistemológicas. Além disso, vamos discutir também, durante as aulas, quais podem ser as consequências clínicas dos pressupostos teóricos da proposta freudiana.
Freud e a Interpretação dos Sonhos
32 horas
Inscrições abertas até 04/05/2015.
O objetivo do curso é analisar a origem, a formação e a lógica envolvida na ideia freudiana de interpretação do sonho, particularmente no que se refere às suas possibilidades e motivações epistemológicas. Além disso, vamos discutir também, durante as aulas, quais podem ser as consequências clínicas dos pressupostos teóricos da proposta freudiana.
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